

# Hasan Abo Kasrah's Role in the Ethnic Massacres of Alawite Civilians – Syria, March 2025

Prepared for submission to international human rights bodies and legal entities  
Date: April 2025

# 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between March 6 and 13, 2025, mass killings targeting Alawite civilians were carried out in over 40 towns and villages across the Syrian coastal region, resulting in at least 1,400 deaths. These killings were carried out by HTS-led forces and Turkish-backed factions, in what Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International described as systematic and coordinated attacks.

This report presents direct and verifiable evidence linking Hasan Abo Kasrah, the current head of Sadcop (the Syrian Transitional Government-controlled petroleum company), to the massacres. It documents:

- Public sectarian incitement by Hasan Abo Kasrah via social media before and during the massacres.
- His physical armed presence during the March 7 Al-Mukhtariyah massacre, confirmed by geolocation, video stills, and satellite coordinates.
- His familial and operational ties to HTS Minister of Defense Murhaf Abo Kasrah, aka Abu Hasan al-Hamwi.
- Sadcop's strategic role in logistical support and post-conflict energy control.

This report calls for an international investigation and urgent action to prosecute individuals and entities responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

## 2. Methodology & Sources

This report is based on a combination of open-source intelligence (OSINT), first-hand digital evidence, and verified third-party human rights documentation. The compilation follows best practices in evidence verification, digital forensics, and contextual analysis of armed conflict.

### 2.1 Data Collection Methods:

#### 2.1.1 Social Media Archiving:

All posts made by Hasan Abo Kasrah were archived via screenshots, cross-verified with public timestamps, and assessed for authenticity through platform double-checking. Language used was preserved in original Arabic and translated to English with contextual accuracy.

#### 2.1.2 Geolocation & Image Verification:

Visual materials were analyzed using satellite imagery, reverse image search, terrain and object recognition (e.g., grain silos, geographic elevation), and timestamped footage to confirm time and place of presence.

#### 2.1.3 Telegram Monitoring:

Announcements from HTS-affiliated and SNA-affiliated Telegram channels (primarily @rd3\_al3dwan) were archived and tracked to map real-time mobilization, target identification, and public military narratives leading up to and during the massacres.

#### 2.1.4 Media & Human Rights Reports:

Contextual validation was carried out using reports from:

- Amnesty International
- Human Rights Watch (HRW)
- Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)
- Daraj Media, Anadolu Agency, Reuters, France24, CNN, and others.

These helped triangulate event timelines, identify affected areas, and validate incident magnitude.

#### 2.1.5 Casualty Data Provided by Independent Sources:

Victim data across 40+ affected towns was compiled with internal cross-referencing. Due to safety concerns and lack of in-person access, witness interviews were not conducted, but civilian death counts were corroborated with existing HR reports and internal lists.

#### 2.1.6 Limitations:

Lack of full access to military documents or private intelligence sources.

Inability to safely contact victims or survivors inside affected areas at the time of writing.

Attribution of some materials is based on strong evidence but without judicial authentication (e.g., familial ties through social media acknowledgment)

### 3. Background Context

#### The Post-Assad Transition and Rise of HTS-Led Authority

Following the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024, power vacuums in Syria's coastal and northwestern regions were rapidly filled by armed factions, primarily Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units. HTS, originally an offshoot of Jabhat al-Nusra, evolved into the dominant military and political actor in large swaths of northern Syria, forming an interim government with control over security, media, energy, and internal governance.

As the regime's grip disintegrated, opposition-aligned factions quickly declared control over strategic sites in Latakia, Tartous, and the Alawite-heavy regions of the coastal mountains, western Hama and Homs. In the weeks following Assad's fall, public discourse shifted from anti-regime sentiment to sectarian vengeance and "cleansing" narratives, with coastal areas being described by HTS and associated channels as nests of "filool" (remnants of the Assad regime) and "Rafidha" (a derogatory term used for Shia/non-Sunni Muslims)

#### 3.1 Ethnic and Sectarian Tensions

The Alawite sect — a heterodox Shia Muslim minority to which Bashar al-Assad belonged — had been closely associated with the regime throughout the civil war. This made Alawite civilians an explicit target during the transitional power struggle. Years of pro-regime alignment by Alawite militias were used as pretexts for collective punishment, despite many civilians having no military ties.

This culminated in a wave of systematic violence beginning on March 6, 2025, which continued for over a week across Latakia, Tartous, Hama, and parts of Homs, resulting in over 1,400 documented civilian deaths, most of whom were Alawite non-combatants.

#### 3.2 Role of Sadcop and Emerging War Economy

In the post-regime economy, HTS swiftly nationalized and redistributed key state infrastructure. The SADCOP petroleum company — formerly regime-run — was handed over to Hasan Abo Kasrah, who assumed control over distribution and logistics. With fuel being a strategic asset during war, Sadcop became one of the tools utilized for facilitating HTS military operations across coastal regions.

As the cousin of Murhaf Abo Kasrah (Minister of Defense), Hasan Abo Kasrah's position extended beyond economic management. He became a military figure and social media "blogger" whitewashing HTS's agenda, operating within and alongside HTS combat units.

## 4. Profile of Hasan Abo Kasrah

**Name:** Hasan Abo Kasrah (حسن أبو قصرة)

**Position:** Director of Sadcop (Syrian Petroleum Storage and Distribution Company)

**Affiliation:** HTS-aligned economic leadership

**Confirmed Relationship:** Cousin of Murhaf Abo Kasrah (HTS Minister of Defense), known by his noms de guerre Abu Hasan al-Hamwi and Abu Hasan 600

### 4.1 Political and Operational Relevance

Hasan Abo Kasrah rose to public prominence after the fall of the Assad regime, assuming control over Sadcob, which is a state-run fuel distribution company. His management of Sadcob placed him at the center of post-conflict energy logistics, enabling him to coordinate with HTS combat units and local administrative bodies.

His presence extended far beyond business. From the first days of HTS consolidation over the coastal region, Hasan began:

- Posting sectarian and militarized propaganda on social media
- Participating in combat patrols, particularly in the Latakia countryside
- Publicly celebrating massacres and military assaults on Alawite villages
- Acting as a spokesperson and influencer for HTS-aligned factions, appearing in combat footage and pro-war content

His online behavior, operational presence, and links to the HTS military hierarchy identify him as more than a civilian figure or businessman. He is a propagandist, combatant, and enabler of sectarian mass violence.

## 5. Evidence of Incitement to Violence

Hasan Abo Kasrah used his personal Facebook profile to publish repeated, explicit calls for violence and dehumanization of Alawite civilians in the days leading up to and during the coastal massacres. His posts were publicly viewable and widely circulated among HTS-aligned digital networks.

The following entries have been archived with screenshots. The original Arabic has been preserved, and the English translation is included with contextual analysis. These posts are currently still up on Facebook.

### 5.1 March 6, 2025 – The Night Before the Mukhtariya Massacre

#### 5.1.1 Post 1



Arabic: "الكلاب بدها تشبع لحم عالسحور اليوم"

Translation: "The dogs want to feast on meat at suhoor tonight."

Context: This is a thinly veiled reference to upcoming killings, dehumanizing the victims (Alawites) as "meals" for their murder to treat as a "meal." The phrase "Suhoor" anchors the timing of the attack around early morning, during the holy month of Ramadan — which matches the 8:30 AM start time of the Mukhtariya massacre (as confirmed by Daraj Media).

#### 5.1.2 Post 2



Arabic: "الأغبياء أعطونا فرصة ذهبية وجاري استغلالها على أكمل وجه"

Translation: "The fools gave us a golden opportunity, and we are making full use of it."

Context: Suggests coordination and premeditation. Published hours before the attacks began.

## 5.2 March 12, 2025 – In the Midst of Ongoing Massacres

### 5.2.1 Post 3 – Video of HTS Fighters



Caption: "هذا المزح عندنا، كيف الجد؟ اسألوا الفلول عنا."

Translation: "This is us joking — imagine when we're serious. Ask the remnants [regime loyalists] about us."

Media: A video showing militants on a technical (pickup truck with mounted gun), speeding toward the coast.

Views: Over 250,000.

Analysis: Direct glorification of the military assault campaign on the coast.

## 5.3 March 17, 2025 – After Thousands Have Been Killed

### 5.3.1 Post 4



Arabic: "مدافع 130 تُرْمَل نساء الروافض، مُمتَهَنات المتعة"

Translation: "130 mm cannons are turning the women of the Rawafid into widows — the mut'ah prostitutes."

Context: Highly sectarian and misogynistic. "Rawafid" is a derogatory term for Shia/Alawites; "mut'ah" refers to temporary marriage in Shia Islam, used here to mock and dehumanize Alawite women - falsely and unjustly tying Alawites to Shia Islam to turn the massacre to a conflict with a political and religious aspect.

### 5.3.2 Post 5



Arabic: "قبل أسبوع ربينا السعادين بالفلول، بس يبدو السعادين أفهم منكم"

Translation: "A week ago we raised monkeys with the remnants. Turns out the monkeys are smarter than you."

Analysis: Further dehumanization of victims. Published exactly one week after Mukhtariya, this implies not only pride in the violence but contempt for those who survived or questioned it.

#### These posts, in summary:

- Show premeditated intent to commit sectarian violence
- Reflect real-time participation in a military campaign
- Contribute to incitement under international criminal law
- Were shared from a verified public account belonging to Hasan Abo Kasra



## 6. Evidence of Direct Involvement in the Mukhtariya Massacre


Hasan Abo Kasrah was not merely an inciter of violence — he was physically present, armed, and participating in HTS/SNA operations on the morning of March 7, 2025, when the Mukhtariya massacre began. The following materials offer irrefutable proof of his presence and operational role.

### 6.1. Confirmed Date and Time of Massacre

Daraj Media, a reputable regional outlet, confirmed that the Mukhtariya massacre began at 8:30 AM on March 7, 2025.

Multiple human rights organizations and witnesses corroborated this timeline.

### 6.2 Visual Documentation of Hasan Abo Kasrah on the M4 Highway



Shows Hasan Abo Kasrah armed, standing on the M4 highway adjacent to Mukhtariya village. Background landmark: Grain silos (شركة المهيمن) visible — used to geolocate his exact position.

### 6.3 Satellite Geolocation

Location: 35.5751206, 35.9387540



Matches terrain, structures, and direction of the visual content.

His orientation, direction of movement, and tactical posture align with known HTS staging patterns before the massacre.

## 6.4 Topographical Overlay & Video Stills

A mapped analysis of satellite imagery and user-submitted footage shows:


The route taken by fighters from M4 into Al-Mukhtariya.

A video shows black smoke rising from homes identified via satellite — matching the direction Hasan was facing.

## 6.5 Evidence of Being Armed

In the image, Hasan is holding a semi-automatic rifle and wearing tactical combat attire — consistent with HTS fighters on that day. No visible insignia of civilian protection or humanitarian role.

## 6.6 Match With Facebook Identity



Facial features from this photo match selfies and profile pictures from his public Facebook page.

Visual confirmation of identity removes ambiguity about whether this was another individual.

## 6.7 Location Tag on Social Media

On March 6, Hasan tagged himself as being in Latakia, a known HTS staging area for coastal operations.

## 7. Links to HTS and Military Operations

Hasan Abo Kasrah was not acting alone. His actions and presence must be viewed within the hierarchical and operational structure of HTS and its transitional authority, which replaced regime governance in the coastal regions post-Assad.

### 7.1 Familial Link to HTS Military Leadership

Murhaf Abo Kasrah, known by the noms de guerre Abu Hasan al-Hamwi and Abu Hasan 600, is the current Minister of Defense for HTS.

A public Facebook interaction confirms that Hasan refers to Murhaf as “ابن عمي” (my cousin), verifying their familial connection.



This relationship places Hasan within the ruling military elite of HTS, likely granting him privileged access to operations, intelligence, and impunity.

### 7.2 Role in Sadcob and Strategic Fuel Access

After HTS seized control of Sadcob, Syria’s main fuel distributor, Hasan was appointed its head — documented in the SANA news article (source).

This gave him strategic leverage over logistics, transportation, and supply lines across HTS-held territories, including for military vehicles.

It also suggests state-aligned endorsement within the new governance structure.

There was a documented attack on a Sadcop’s center by Assad’s remnants, which further connects Hasan Abo Kasrah with the HTS military operation.

### 7.3 HTS/SNA Telegram Channel Announcements (March 6–9)

Posts from the official t.me/rd3\_al3dwan Telegram channel demonstrate clear coordination of a general mobilization, which in an Islamic sense might be interpreted as jihad against “kuffar”.

- Public Calls for Jihad from mosques in Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama.
- Orders for military assault on coastal areas, naming villages later confirmed as massacre sites.
- Mobilization of rocket launchers, warplanes, and armored convoys.
- Messaging encouraged civilians in coastal areas to either stay home or be treated as enemies.

These posts align chronologically with Hasan’s inciting Facebook posts and geographically with his presence on the M4.

### 7.4 Massacre Campaign Consistency

Hasan’s physical presence in Al-Mukhtariya on March 7, social media activity across the week, and celebratory tone after the killings directly match: Telegram operations orders, Victim count escalation, and HTS’s phased expansion into the coast. This implies that he was either acting with direct operational orders or was a key propagandist and enabler of a state-led ethnic cleansing campaign.

## 8. Victim Data and Affected Locations (March 6–13, 2025)

The massacres that began in Al-Mukhtariya on March 6–7, 2025, were not isolated incidents, but part of a systematic, multi-day campaign carried out by HTS/SNA-affiliated forces with sectarian motivations. Over 1,400 civilians, primarily Alawites, were killed across dozens of towns and villages.

Hasan Abo Kasrah's direct involvement in the March 7 Mukhtariya massacre, coupled with his incitement and presence on Telegram-aligned military routes, connects him to the larger context of coordinated ethnic violence.

### 8.1 Confirmed and Documented Massacres:

- **8.1.1 March 6, 2025 – Total: ~160 documented deaths**

Mukhtariya, Al Sheer, Al Haffah, Qarfys, Dwayr Baabdeh, Salhab, Baniyas, Yahmour

- **8.1.2 March 7, 2025 – Total: ~366 deaths**

Mukhtariya (continued), Sharrafa, Hannadi, Latakia, Snobar (documented by CNN, Jableh, Beit Loho, Blouzeh, Hammam Wasel, Tawaym

- **8.1.3 March 8, 2025 – Total: ~303 deaths**

Al Bahloulyah, Snobar, Eyn El Kroum, Besaysin, Nahr El Bared, Baniyas, Tartous, Al Musherfeh, Al Almein, Tremseh, Ashrafyah, Homs

- **8.1.4 March 9, 2025 – Total: ~263 deaths**

Jawbat Istamo, Ain Al Arous, Hraysoun, Salhab, Tahonet Al Halaweh, Asilah, Al Hittaneh, Bjannah, Al Quneitra, Arman of Homs

- **8.1.5 March 10, 2025 – Total: ~132 deaths**

Latakia, Hraysoun, Brabeshbo, Baniyas, Al Tawahin

- **8.1.6 March 11, 2025 – Total: ~158 deaths**

Sqoubin, Snobar, Baniyas, Barmaya, Rusafa, Arza

- **8.1.7 March 12, 2025 – Total: ~93 deaths**

Al Zoubar, Sharrafa, Mukhtariya (3rd wave)

Al Rowaiyhah, Qabu, Shamboutin, Al Burjan, Al Hatriah, Taanitah, Hraysoun, Rusafa, Ain Balouj

#### ***Cumulative Documented Fatalities:***

~1,475 Alawite civilians, mostly non-combatants including women, children, and elderly.

### 8.2 Patterns:

Most villages were majority-Alawite.

All were located near strategic routes: the M4 Highway, Latakia–Tartous corridor, or foothills of coastal mountains.

Victims were often executed, burned, or targeted inside homes.

Operations were often preceded by general mobilization orders and followed by celebratory posts on HTS social media.

### 8.3 Implication:

Hasan Abo Kasrah was present at the first wave of killings and continued to incite and mock victims as the massacres expanded across the coast. His role in Sadcob gave him movement capacity, logistical access, and impunity, all while maintaining online visibility.



## 9. Regional, Political, and International Reactions

### 9.1 Alawite Community's Response

The Alawite community in early 2025 demonstrated an unprecedented degree of political divergence and civil mobilization following the massacres:

**9.1.1 Limited Role of Traditional Religious Authorities:** The traditional Alawite sheikhs, often viewed as extensions of the Ba'athist state apparatus, played a minimal role in the grassroots response to the violence. Their influence remains symbolic, not representative of the broader Alawite civilian population. They have called for Russian intervention, by offering "protection" or putting Syria under Chapter VII at the UNSC.

**9.1.2 Exodus to the Russian Hmeimim Base:** Over 10,000 Alawite civilians sought refuge at the Russian Hmeimim Air Base near Jableh beginning mid-March. These individuals, mainly women, children, and the elderly, escaped massacres in Sanobar, Qarfys, Ain El Arous and surrounding towns.

**9.1.3 Demands Raised:** These internally displaced civilians collectively demanded the establishment of an internationally monitored safe zone, the delegitimization of the transitional government under Ahmad Sharaa, and immediate humanitarian assistance.

**9.1.4 Political Mobilization Abroad:**

A delegation led by Professor Issa Ibrahim, representing the Syrian Alawites Union in Europe, met with French officials including Valerie Pécresse and Interior Minister Bruno Rotayot.

Prof. Ibrahim previously released a statement to the international community denounced the events on the coast as sectarian genocide, citing:

- Mass killings, abductions, and enforced disappearances
- Religious-based property destruction and denial of services
- Exclusion from citizenship under the new constitutional order

The statement called for:

- Immediate international protection and deployment of observers
- A tribunal to prosecute war crimes
- A UN-administered peacekeeping presence in Alawite-majority areas
- A referendum for self-determination and protection of secular governance

### 9.2 International Condemnations and Diplomatic Responses

**9.2.1 France:** The French Foreign Minister condemned the massacres explicitly as attacks on civilians in "the Alawite Coast" — signaling recognition of the sectarian and ethnic dimensions of the conflict. France also advocated sanctions on perpetrators.

**9.2.2 United States:**

On March 9, Secretary of State Marco Rubio denounced the massacres, characterizing them as attacks by radical Islamist terrorists and foreign jihadis.

He expressed solidarity with Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Christian communities and demanded the Sharaa-led authorities pursue criminal accountability.

**9.2.3 Russia:**

In a closed-door UN Security Council session on March 13, Russia compared the mass killings of Alawites to the Rwandan genocide and cautioned the international community against supporting Syria's rising jihadist factions.

**9.2.4 Other Notable Reactions:**

Walid Phares, with endorsements from Christian and Greek Orthodox figures, described the events as a "neo-Ottoman-style ethnic purge". Former Greek Prime Minister and Maronite bishops echoed concerns about regional destabilization.

## 9.3 Human Rights Organizations

### 9.3.1 Amnesty International (April 3, 2025 Report):

Amnesty documented over 1,700 deaths of Alawite civilians in March 2025.

Detailed events in Baniyas (March 8-9) where government-affiliated militias executed civilians after identifying them by sect.

Confirmed mass graves in al-Qusour neighborhood and systematic looting.

Criticized the transitional government for failure to intervene and direct complicity via its integrated HTS units.

Demands issued: Full international investigation, Prosecution of HTS officials, Exclusion of perpetrators from future governance, Humanitarian access and restitution for displaced Alawites

### 9.3.2 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR):

Confirmed over 1,000 deaths within 48 hours of the March 6 offensive.

Noted that the first wave of massacres was highly coordinated across Mukhtariya, Yahmour, Al Sheer, Al Haffah, Qarfys, Dwayr Baabdeh, Baniyas, and Salhab.

### 9.3.3 United Nations Human Rights Office (March 11):

Verified reports that entire Alawite families were wiped out.

Recorded mass violations including rape, torture, desecration of religious symbols, and public executions of defected officers.

### CNN (March 17):

Released geolocated footage from al-Sanobar village showing fighters celebrating around civilian corpses.

## 9.4 Political Significance

The term "Alawite Coast" used in diplomatic circles (France) indicates a shift toward ethno-regional recognition of the Alawite plight, previously suppressed under pan-Syrian, pan-Arab/Baathist or pan-Shiite rhetoric.

Russia's comparison to Rwanda highlights the risk of genocide designation, with legal and diplomatic ramifications.

The actions of the Alawite diaspora and mobilization at the Hmeimim base mark a new phase in Alawite political identity, no longer strictly tied to the Assad legacy but asserting collective victimhood and demands for international protection.

## 10. Legal Analysis & Genocide Criteria

This section assesses the applicability of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the actions committed by HTS-led forces, Sadcop operatives under Hasan Abo Kasrah, and Syrian transitional government affiliates.

### 10.1 Intent to Destroy, in Whole or in Part, a Religious or Ethnic Group

Verified social media incitement indicates sectarian hatred toward Alawites.

Statements such as “the coast must be cleansed” and “burn their homes before Suhoor” show genocidal intent.

### 10.2 Killing Members of the Group

Amnesty confirms over 1,700 Alawite civilians killed.

UN and SOHR highlight deliberate targeting of entire families.

Hasan Abo Kasrah’s presence at massacre scenes supports command responsibility.

### 10.3 Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm

Mass executions, house burnings, and abductions reported.

Forcible public humiliation and coerced denunciations inflicted lasting psychological trauma.

### 10.4 Deliberately Inflicting Conditions to Bring About Destruction

Alawite-majority areas deliberately starved of aid and besieged.

Medical access denied and homes systematically destroyed.

### 10.5 Forcible Transfers and Displacement

Thousands displaced to Russian bases (Hmeimim).

Alawites expelled from civil service and persecuted based on sect.

### 10.6 Complicity and Coordination

Hasan Abo Kasrah’s dual role (civilian-military) and Sadcop’s resources used to assist HTS offensives.

Ministry of Defense and armed factions failed to protect civilians under their jurisdiction, suggesting complicity.

### 10.7 Accountability under Rome Statute

The crimes committed fall under:

Article 6 (Genocide)

Article 7 (Crimes Against Humanity – Extermination, Persecution)

Article 8 (War Crimes – Attacks on Civilians, Property Destruction)

The convergence of verified incitement, systematic targeting, and coordinated mass violence meets the threshold of genocide under international law. The evidence links Hasan Abo Kasrah and HTS-aligned state actors to a campaign of ethnic cleansing that merits prosecution before an international tribunal or the ICC.

## 11. Recommendations and Demands

Based on the findings, documentation, and eyewitness evidence presented in this report, the following urgent recommendations and demands are issued to the international community, the United Nations, human rights organizations, and state actors:

### 11.1 Immediate International Intervention

Deploy UN or international observers and humanitarian protection missions to the Syrian coastal region, especially in Latakia, Tartous, and Hama, to prevent further mass atrocities and provide immediate aid to survivors.

Establish safe zones for displaced Alawite civilians, particularly around the Russian Hmeimim base and other areas of refuge.

### 11.2 Independent Investigation and Accountability

Launch an independent, international investigation under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council or the International Criminal Court to:

Investigate the massacres from March 6–13, 2025, which are still (low-key) ongoing.

Identify direct perpetrators, commanders, and political figures (including Hasan Abo Kasrah).

Document command responsibility, coordination, and complicity at the highest levels of the HTS-led government and affiliated factions.

Prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under international law, particularly targeting ethnic cleansing of Alawite civilians.

### 11.3 Humanitarian Response

Facilitate emergency aid deliveries, medical assistance, and psychosocial support to affected communities.

Support burial and identification efforts for mass graves in Baniyas, Mukhtariya, and Sanobar, ensuring dignity and documentation for victims.

Enable return and resettlement of displaced Alawite families with guarantees of safety and reparations.

### 11.4 Political Protections and Safeguards

Recognize Alawites as an endangered ethnic-religious community under international minority protection frameworks.

Push for constitutional guarantees that prohibit sectarian discrimination and ensure full political, civil, and cultural rights to Alawites and other minorities.

Include Alawite representation in all transitional justice processes and national reconciliation initiatives.

### 11.5 Sanctions and Diplomatic Measures

Impose targeted sanctions on individuals, commanders, and entities involved in atrocities, including the leadership of HTS and affiliated paramilitary groups.

Freeze assets, ban travel, and restrict political legitimacy of those complicit in planning or executing mass killings.

### 11.6 International Solidarity

Request symbolic acknowledgment by national parliaments (e.g. EU, France, US Congress).



## 12. Visual & Geospatial Evidence

This section contains 12 figures: 3 satellite overlays, 4 Facebook post screenshots, 2 video stills, and 3 field photos.

Links:

Official military operations channel ([t.me/ed3\\_al3dwan](https://t.me/ed3_al3dwan) )

SANA article (<https://sana.sy/?p=2187593> ) confirming Hasan Abo Kasrah's position

Anatolia Agency on the sadcob attack:  
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syrian-security-forces-foil-attack-by-former-regime-loyalists-on-sad-cop-petroleum-facility/3504284?hl=en-US>

Amnesty International Report:

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/04/syria-coastal-massacres-of-alawite-civilians-must-be-investigated-as-war-crimes/>

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR):

<https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025>

Daraj Media:

<https://daraj.media/en/the-massacre-of-the-alawis-and-the-future-of-syria/>

Reuters on Damascus violence:

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sectarian-violence-reached-capital-terrorizing-alawites-residents-say-2025-03-27/>

France24 on transitional government:

<https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250310-massacre-of-1-500-in-alawite-heartland-casts-doubt-on-new-syrian-government-s-ability-to-rule>

Human Rights Watch (on general mobilization)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/10/syria-end-coastal-killing-spree-protect-civilians>

<https://web.archive.org/web/20250312190652/https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/10/syria-end-coastal-killing-spree-protect-civilians>

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List of Hasan Abo Kasrah Posts:

[first](#) [second](#) [third](#) [fourth](#) [fifth](#) [sixth](#) [seventh](#) [eighth](#) [ninth](#) [tenth](#) [eleventh](#) [twelfth](#) [thirteenth](#) [fourteenth](#)

Military Operations Channel:

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6493](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6493)

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6496](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6496)

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6503](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6503)

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[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6554](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6554)

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6560](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6560)

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6567](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6567)

[https://t.me/rd3\\_al3dwan/6585](https://t.me/rd3_al3dwan/6585)

Between March 6 and 13, 2025, Syria's coastal region witnessed a coordinated wave of massacres targeting Alawite civilians. Over 40 villages were attacked in succession, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,700 individuals, according to Amnesty International and SOHR. The violence was sectarian in nature, planned through open mobilization campaigns, and executed by a network of military, paramilitary, and administrative actors affiliated with the HTS-led transitional government.

At the center of this violence stands Hasan Abo Kasrah,

Publicly inciting hatred and glorifying violence online.

Armed and present at the scene of massacres in Mukhtariya.

A confirmed cousin of HTS Minister of Defense Murhaf Abo Kasrah, embedding him within the ruling military elite.

Head of Sadcob, a company repurposed for wartime fuel logistics under the new government — a critical position enabling troop movement and supply in conflict zones.

The evidence presented in this report — visual, spatial, testimonial, and institutional — demonstrates clear intent, execution, and coordination in what meets multiple international legal thresholds for:

Crimes against humanity

Ethnic cleansing

Intentions of Committing Genocide

Multiple international actors, including France, the United States, Russia, and human rights bodies, have condemned the violence. Survivors, civil society representatives, and diaspora figures have called for urgent international protection, legal accountability, and minority safeguards.

The report concludes with an urgent call:

To prosecute perpetrators, including Hasan Abo Kasrah.

To establish safe zones and prevent further atrocities.

To recognize the systematic extermination of Alawite civilians as a crime that must not go unpunished.